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THE ECONOMIC DOWNTURN AND THE LEGAL
PROFESSION
FOREWORD: THE GREAT RECESSION AND THE
LEGAL PROFESSION
Eli Wald*
Although historians will surely devote much ink--or bytes-to the
financial crisis, I believe that this time will be known as an inflection
point in world history because of huge revolutions under way in the
world-changes that make this an electrifying time to be in the legal
profession.
- Martha L. Minow, Dean of the Harvard Law School, January 20101
Perhaps with historical hindsight, 2008-2009 will be remembered not for
the Great Recession 2 that first rocked the U.S. residential mortgage credit
market, then froze American and global financial markets and eventually
led to a worldwide recession, but as an inflection point for world history,
the U.S. economy, and the legal profession. But in the short run, at least,
the impact of the economic meltdown on the legal profession has been quite
devastating: unprecedented layoffs, 3 salary decreases, 4 hiring freezes
* Charles W. Delaney Jr. Associate Professor of Law and Hughes-Ruud Research Professor,
University of Denver Sturm College of Law. The papers collected in this issue were
presented at a conference entitled The Economic Downturn and the Legal Profession, hosted
by Fordham Law School in October 2009, and co-sponsored by the Fordham Law Review,
the Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics at Fordham Law School, and the University of
Denver Sturm College of Law. A special thanks to Bruce Green, Director of the Louis Steirn
Center, Jessi Tamayo, Associate Director of the Louis Stein Center, Diane Burkhardt,
Faculty Services Liaison at the Westminster Law Library at the University of Denver Sturm
College of Law, and the editors of the Fordham Law Review.
1. Q&A: Points of Inflection: A Conversation with a New Dean, HARv. L. BULL.,
Winter 2010, at 14, 14 (Q&A with Dean Martha Minow).
2. See Richard A. Posner, When Does a Depression or a Recession End?, ATLANTIC,
Aug. 1, 2009, http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2009/08/when-does-a-depression-
or-a-recession-end/22544/ (noting that the economic downturn of 2008-2009 is being
referred to by some commentators as the "Great Recession").
3. Law Shucks, a blog dedicated to large law firms, reports that between January 1,
2008, and January 31, 2010, over 14,347 people have been laid off by major law firms alone
(5632 lawyers/8715 staff). See Law Shucks, Layoff Tracker, http://lawshucks.com/layoff-
tracker/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2010).
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resulting in an extraordinary number of unemployed law school graduates
nationwide, 5 even deaths. 6
The long-term consequences of the economic downturn are less certain.
While some believe that the Great Recession will have permanent adverse
effects on the legal profession, 7 it is important to bear in mind that points of
significant distress are at the same time moments of great opportunity, 8 and
the legal profession, with its track record of adapting to changing practice
realities while successfully maintaining its elite professional, financial, and
cultural status atop U.S. society,9 may end up stronger than ever. The
experience of the bar following the Great Depression is instructive in this
regard, as lawyers eventually emerged from it not only as architects and
leaders of the New Deal but also established themselves, over time, as
principal actors in the administration of government and the (lucrative)
4. See, e.g., Martha Neil, Some BigLaw Leaders Still Ponder: How Low Can Associate
Salaries Go?, A.B.A. J., Oct. 6, 2009, http://www.abajoumal.com/weekly/
some-biglaw leaders still-ponder how low-canassociate salaries-go (analyzing trend of
lower associate salaries at large law firms); Debra Cassens Weiss, First-Year Associates
Bear the Brunt of Lower Bonuses; Some See Cuts of 71%, A.B.A. J., Dec. 21, 2009,
http://www.abajournal.com/weekly/article/first-year-associates-bear_the-brunt of lower_
bonuses-some see cuts-of_71 (reporting on decreases in lawyers' salaries and bonuses).
5. See, e.g., Matt Masich, Law School Career Offices Seek Fix for More Lawyers,
Fewer Jobs, LAW WK. ONLINE, Oct. 21, 2009, http://www.lawweekonline.com/
2009/10/career-offices-seek-fix-for-more-lawyers-fewer-jobs/ (discussing the impact of the
recession on recruitment of graduates at a top-fifty law school); Debra Cassens Weiss,
Downturn's Losers: BigLaw, 'Entitled' Associates, Top Schools, A.B.A. J., May 7, 2009,
http://www.abajoumal.com/weekly/downtums-losers-biglaw-entitled associates_top schools
(commenting on the impact of the recession on recruitment of graduates of elite law
schools); see also William D. Henderson & Andrew P. Morriss, What Law School Rankings
Don't Say About Costly Choices, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 16, 2009, http://www.law.com/
jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id = 1207904889498&slreturn=l &hbxlogin = .
6. E.g., Richard B. Schmitt, A Death in the Office, A.B.A. J., Nov. 2009, at 30
(reporting on the suicide of prominent appellate litigator Mark Levy, who took his own life
after being fired during the economic downturn).
7. A recent survey on the state of the legal profession conducted by LexisNexis
reported that over half of the attorneys surveyed believed that the recession will permanently
change legal practice. LExISNEXIS, STATE OF THE LEGAL INDUSTRY SURVEY: COMPLETE
SURVEY FINDINGS 10 (2009); see also Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law (Univ. of Ill.
Law & Econ. Research Paper. No. LE09-025, 2009), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract= 1467730; Brian Leiter's Law School Reports, http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/
leiter/2009/04/the-upheaval-in-the-market-for-new-lawyers-at-the-big-law-firms-temporary-
or-permanent.html (Apr. 30, 2009, 13:57 EST).
8. See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings & Deborah L.. Rhode, Managing Pro Bono: Doing
Well by Doing Better, 78 FORDnAM L. REV. 2357 (2010). See generally Jacques Derrida,
Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority," 11 CARDozo L. REV. 919, 955
(1990) (exploring "anxiety-ridden moment[s] of suspense"). The great legal scholar Homer
Simpson refers to such a moment in time as a "crisitunity," to capture both the notions of
crisis and opportunity. The Simpsons: Fear of Flying (Fox television broadcast Dec. 18,
1994). "Yes! Crisitunity!" is Homer's response when Lisa informs him that "the Chinese
use the same word for 'crisis' as they do for 'opportunity."' Id.
9. See, e.g., Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers as America's Governing Class: The
Formation and Dissolution of the Original Understanding of the American Lawyer's Role, 8
U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 381 (2001).
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implementation of administrative law. 10 Of course, the bar may experience
the Great Recession quite differently; yet the possibility of long-term
growth, innovation, and resurgence should not be discounted, and claims
regarding the death of the profession and some of its leading institutions
may be premature. 11
In this Symposium issue, leading scholars of the legal profession begin
the process of exploring the impact of the Great Recession on various
segments of the legal profession and on the bar as a whole, examining both
the unique consequences of the economic downturn and their interplay with
contemporary trends that were already underway before the recession hit.
That the stratification of the bar12 may lead to variation in how differently
situated lawyers experience the economic downturn and, consequently, to
variation in their response to change seems straightforward. For example,
mergers and acquisitions as well as securities attorneys no doubt
experienced the financial meltdown that brought their respective practices
to a near halt much more severely than bankruptcy lawyers who saw a surge
in demand for their services; large law firms and their lawyers likely
experienced the downturn quite differently than solo practitioners and
small-firm attorneys.
Yet stratification also leads to more nuanced and less obvious responses
as demonstrated by the experience of the legal profession following the
Great Depression, an experience that provides clues regarding the complex
ways in which severe economic stress impacts the profession in the long
run. The Great Depression exposed significant tensions between the
majority of lawyers who struggled to survive and elite large law firm
lawyers who worried not only about declining profits but also about
maintaining their elevated professional status. As a result, solo
practitioners and elite corporate lawyers pushed for different, indeed
conflicting, strategies of response. 13 The experience of the legal profession
10. Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Legal Profession and the Development of Administrative
Law, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1119, 1120 (1997) ("By any standard it appears as if the
administrative state, and the regulatory regimes that came with it, provided the legal
profession with innumerable professional opportunities. The inevitable link between
overregulation through administrative agencies and the economic welfare of lawyers has
now become the dominant... account." (citing PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON
SENSE 10-11, 22-29 (1994))). For a revealing contemporaneous account of how the
growing New Deal administration was marshaled by lawyers and appropriated as a matter of
administrative law, see Carl McFarland, Administrative Agencies in Government and the
Effect Thereon of Constitutional Limitations, 20 A.B.A. J. 612 (1934).
11. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 7.
12. See generally JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE
SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (1982) (coining the classic term "hemispheres" of lawyers to
denote that the legal profession consists of two categories of lawyers whose practice settings,
socioeconomic and ethnoreligious backgrounds, education, and clientele differ
considerably).
13. See Ronen Shamir, Professionalism and Monopoly of Expertise: Lawyers and
Administrative Law, 1933-1937, 27 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 361, 363, 378 (1993) [hereinafter
Shamir, Professionalism]. Ronen Shamir explores the tension between the bar and its elite
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in the aftermath of the Great Depression thus advises that it would be a
mistake to assume a unified response by the bar and suggests the wisdom of
exploring the diversity of experiences along different segments of the
profession and the likelihood of a multitude of responses.
Moreover, the past experience of the profession also suggests that
economic stress may cause intraprofessional competition and tension
adding to increased external competition in the market for legal services. 14
Intraprofessional strife caused by severe economic stress has the potential to
bring about mobility within the profession, unsettle hierarchies, threaten
established elites, and open the door for the rise of alternative elite
structures: 15 New Deal lawyers were mostly outsiders, a "coalition of
minorities-social, ethnic, regional, and intellectual,"' 16 who flocked to
Washington D.C. "with their hair ablaze"'17 seeking social change for the
people and professional change for themselves. The New Deal thus
constituted an opportunity for the formation of a counterelite of lawyers
capable of challenging the dominant position of large Wall Street law firms
atop the profession. 18 While the prospect for the rise of an alternative legal
elite did not materialize as leading New Deal lawyers joined the existing
power structure by starting and entering large law firms in Washington D.C.
and New York City, 19 it nonetheless demonstrated the opportunity for
radical changes and reshaping of the legal elite inherent in extreme
economic moments of instability. Consequently, studies of the fate of the
profession in the aftermath of the Great Recession must be sensitive to the
possibility that the struggles and even decline of some segments of the bar
may open the door and allow other constituencies within the profession to
rise.
Just as they did seventy years ago, large law firms sit atop the legal
profession, 20 rendering the study of large law firms and the challenges they
face in the aftermath of the economic downturn an integral part of any
analysis of the legal elite, the legal profession, and its impact on the
economy. Indeed, in some ways, the role of large law firms has expanded
even further since the 1930s. By the early 2000s, before the recession hit,
in greater detail in RONEN SHAMIR, MANAGING LEGAL UNCERTAINTY: ELITE LAWYERS IN THE
NEW DEAL (1995) [hereinafter SHAMIR, MANAGING LEGAL UNCERTAINTY].
14. See Shamir, Professionalism, supra note 13, at 371-74; see also Harry W. Arthurs &
Robert Kreklewich, Law, Legal Institutions, and the Legal Profession in the New Economy,
34 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 1, 48 (1996) (stating that the legal profession continues to experience
"growing internal political dissension at the very moment when it also confronts the
profound and permanent external challenges of the new economy").
15. Michael E. Parrish, The Great Depression, The New Deal, and the American Legal
Order, 59 WASH. L. REv. 723,746-50 (1984).
16. Id. at 747.
17. See PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS 3 (1982).
18. See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
MODERN AMERICA 191-230 (1976).
19. See Parrish, supra note 15, at 748.
20. See, e.g., ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM 231 (1988).
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large law firms not only dominated the legal elite and served a
disproportionate percentage of large corporate entities, but also were among
the largest and fastest growing segment of the profession, accounting for
approximately eleven percent of all U.S. lawyers21 and recruiting a
staggering one in every four law school graduates nationwide. 22 Moreover,
the challenges facing large law firms have come to resemble the challenges
facing the blue collar bar, with the former confronted with experiencing not
only status anxiety but also, like the rest of the profession, survival
anxiety.23 Consequently, the majority of the papers in this Symposium
issue, dedicated to the study of the economic downturn and the legal
profession, investigate and explore the impact of the Great Recession on
large law firms. The emphasis on the large firm stems from the central role
it plays in shaping practice realities and professional ideologies for its own
lawyers and for the entire legal profession. 24
Unlike the savings and loans crisis of the 1980s and the accounting
meltdowns of the 1990s, in which large law firm attorneys were accused of
playing significant roles in failing to prevent the financial calamities and
even in helping to bring them about,25 it appears that lawyers were not
principal villains in the economic downturn of 2008-2009.26 Lawyers did
21. ABA Lawyer Demographics, http://new.abanet.org/marketresearch/PublicDocuments/
Lawyer Demographics.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2010) (illustrating that in 2000, 74% of U.S.
lawyers worked in private practice and 14% of those were employed by law firms with more
than 100 lawyers, accounting for more than 10% of all U.S. lawyers). The percentage rose
between 2000 and 2007 as large law firms continued to grow and recruit a larger percentage
of law graduates. The National Association of Law Placement (NALP) reports that between
2001 and 2006 law firms recruited over 55% of all law graduates. Large law firms with over
100 lawyers recruited approximately 40% of those graduates, accounting for an astonishing
22% of all graduates nationwide. See Trends in Graduate Employment-I 985-2006, NALP
BULL., July 2007, http://www.nalp.org/2007julgraduateemployment/.
22. In 2007, nearly 23% of all law graduates were hired by large law firms with over
100 lawyers, with a majority of those recruited by law firms with over 500 lawyers. NALP,
CLASS OF 2007 NATIONAL SUMMARY REPORT #2 (2008), available at
http://www.nalp.org/uploads/1229 natlsummary07revised.pdf.
23. See, e.g., John P. Heinz, When Law Firms Fail, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 67 (2009);
Ribstein, supra note 7.
24. See, e.g., Judith S. Kaye, Women Lawyers in Big Firms: A Study in Progress
Toward Gender Equality, 57 FORDHAM L. REv. 111, 112-13 (1988) ("[Wlhat seems to be
happening in the big firms is symptomatic of something more pervasive .... The big firms
cast a giant shadow, in terms of public perceptions of the profession, parallels in other fields,
and standards within the legal community. Their every uptick reverberates widely. [Next],
the actual influence of the big firms and their alumni-many of them general counsels of
major corporations-extends far beyond their numbers.").
25. Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After
Enron, 35 CONN. L. REv. 1185, 1204 (2003) (exploring the role of lawyers in the corporate
meltdown of the 1990s); William H. Simon, Whom (or What) Does the Organization's
Lawyer Represent?: An Anatomy of Intraclient Conflict, 91 CAL. L. REv. 57 (2003) (same);
William H. Simon, The Kaye Scholer Affair: The Lawyer's Duty of Candor and the Bar's
Temptations of Evasion and Apology, 23 LAw & SOC. INQUIRY 243, 280-82 (1998)
(discussing the role of lawyers in the savings and loans crisis of the 1980s).
26. See Posting of Andrew Perlman to Legal Ethics Forum Blog,
http://legalethicsforum.typepad.comiblog/2008/10/the-biggest-leg.html (Oct. 5, 2008, 10:05
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not play a leading role in the deregulation efforts of the 1980s and 1990s,
did not influence the Federal Reserve's policy of not monitoring high-risk
lending entities in the residential mortgage credit market, and were not the
primary architects behind the aggressive and increasingly risk-taking
behavior of financial institutions. 27 The Symposium therefore does not
study whether lawyers caused the Great Recession or failed to prevent it.28
Rather, it focuses on the range of changes it caused to, and accelerated in,
the structure and business models of large firms and the legal services
industry generally; the transformation of ideology and cultural identity of
large firms; changes in the institutional and psychological infrastructure for
ethical decision making within and outside law firms; and the impact the
recession has had on the provision of pro bono services by large law firms
and by traditional pro bono providers.
The Symposium consists of four parts and is organized as follows. Part I,
The Transformation of Large Law Firm Organization and Structure,
includes three contributions that explore the changing landscape of large
law firm organization and structure, studying, respectively, the decline of
the traditional agency-based attorney-client relationship and the rise of an
alternative partnership model; the disaggregation of legal services offered
by large firms and their growing reliance on outsourcing; and the prospect
of law firms engaging in multidisciplinary practices.
Part II, The Changing Professional Landscape of Large Law Firms,
moves past organization and structure to examine the changing ideology of
large law firms and its impact on lawyers practicing within and outside
these institutions. The two contributions complement each other in that the
first takes a "top-to-bottom" approach exploring the new emerging ideology
of large law firms and its impact on specific categories of lawyers employed
by these firms. The second pursues an opposite perspective, inquiring into
individual lawyers' self-understanding of firm culture and professional
ideology and examining the future of the large firm and changes in the
EDT) (opining that the biggest legal ethics story of 2008 was that nobody was blaming
unethical attorneys for the economic crisis).
27. See Carol A. Needham, Listening to Cassandra: The Difficulty of Recognizing Risks
and Taking Action, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 2329 (2010). Although, as David Wilkins notes in
Teams of Rivals? Toward a New Model of the Corporate Attorney-Client Relationship, 78
FoRDHAM L. REv. 2067 (2010), lawyers may have been involved in wrongdoing in the latter
stages on the bailout. Id. at 2068 & n.5 ("[I]t is only a matter of time before the inside and
outside lawyers who represent the banks and other financial institutions we are currently
bailing out will be called upon to take their turn in the dock.").
28. Even if lawyers did not play a leading role in the economic downturn, some may
have been complicit, advising financial institutions on the design of credit swap
securitizations and complex derivatives and counseling regulatory agencies on their
overseeing duties. We may, however, never find out the extent to which lawyers were
actually involved in bringing about and failing to mitigate aspects of the Great Recession
because, as Stephen Gillers has pointed out, the doctrines of confidentiality and privilege
significantly curtail access to such information. See Stephen Gillers, Model Rule 1.13(c)
Gives the Wrong Answer to the Question of Corporate Counsel Disclosure, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 289 (1987) (exploring the impact of confidentiality and privilege on lawyers' ability
to disclose wrongdoing inside and outside of an entity-client).
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industry in which it operates from the point of view of its individual
lawyers.
The concluding four contributions explore the large law firm and its
transcending influence outside of its own borders. Part III, The Evolving
Institutional and Psychological Infrastructure for Ethical Decision Making
at Large Law Firms, studies important changes affecting ethical decision
making within and outside of large law firms. A commentary examines the
growth of risk management processes within large law firms, observing
their impact on systems and structures as well as on culture, that could
inhibit ethical decision making in everyday practice. Another contribution
addresses the psychological factors that influence nonlawyers, lawyers, and
organizations and cause them to deviate from informed and ethical decision
making.
Finally, Part IV, Large Law Firms and the Public Interest: Provision of
Pro Bono Services by Large Law Firms, consisting of a contribution and a
reply, explores the provision of pro bono services by large firms, its overall
impact on pro bono, and the challenge it represents to conventional thinking
about private and public lawyering, and the provision of private and public
legal services.
I. THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF LARGE LAW FIRM ORGANIZATION
AND STRUCTURE
The conventional understanding of the attorney-client relationship is one
of agency, in which lawyer-agents serve the interests of client-principals, 29
subject to the law and duties owed to the legal system and the public.30 The
agency model and the rules of professional conduct that breathe life into it
29. American Bar Association Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(a) allocates
authority in the attorney-client relationship pursuant to a basic agency model, granting
client-principals authority over the goals of the representation and vesting agent-lawyers
with primary authority over the means by which the objectives of the representation are to be
pursued. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2008). This rule adopts another
essential feature of the agency model, holding client-principals alone responsible for the
goals of the relationship and releasing lawyer-agents from legal liability and moral
accountability for the objectives they help clients pursue. Id. R. 1.2(b); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOvERNING LAWYERS ch. 2, introductory n. (2000) ("The
subject of this Chapter is, from one point of view, derived from the law of agency. It
concerns a voluntary arrangement in which an agent, a lawyer, agrees to work for the benefit
of a principal, a client."). See generally CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 146
(1986) ("Whatever may be the models that obtain in other legal cultures, the client-lawyer
relationship in the United States is founded on the lawyer's virtually total loyalty to the
client and the client's interests."); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Triangular Lawyer Relationships:
An Exploratory Analysis, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 15, 21 (1987) ("In the relationship with a
client, the lawyer is required above all to demonstrate loyalty.").
30. Lawyers' agency on behalf of clients is subject to their duties as officers of the court
and as public citizens. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (2008) ("A lawyer, as a
member of the legal profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system
and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice."). Conceptually,
the attorney-client relationship may thus be more accurately characterized not as an
"ordinary agency" but rather as a "limited agency." See Eli Wald, Loyalty in Limbo: The
Peculiar Case of Attorneys' Loyalty to Clients, 40 ST. MARY'S L.J. 909, 952-54 (2009).
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have traditionally assumed lawyers to be powerful vis-A-vis their clients,
who needed protection and guarantees against lawyer abuse. While the
agency model may apply to the relationship of solo and small-firm lawyers
with their individual and small-business clients, 31 it never quite fit the
relationship between large law firms and their large corporate clients, both
because the former were never docile subservient agents deferring to their
clients' objectives, and because the latter were never vulnerable and in need
of regulatory protection against their lawyers.
Current market conditions, argues David B. Wilkins in Team of Rivals?
Toward a New Model of the Corporate Attorney-Client Relationship, have
largely turned the traditional agency model on its head.32 The dominant
theme over the last thirty years, accentuated by the economic downturn, has
been corporate clients' ability to significantly reduce the "information
asymmetries" that used to characterize their relationship with large law
firms. 3 3 In this new climate, corporate clients may use their enhanced
powers to co-opt law firms into facilitating wrongdoing, 34 while the agency
model will give lawyers a pass on the ground that as agents they are not
responsible for the ends of the representation. 35 Against this background,
Wilkins asserts provocatively that the time has come to abandon the
conventional agency-based understanding of the attorney-client relationship
between large corporate law firms and their entity clients. Instead, "the
relationship between these large and sophisticated clients and their
increasingly large and sophisticated outside counsel is better conceptualized
as a new kind of strategic alliance or partnership." 36
Teams of Rivals? Toward a New Model of the Corporate Attorney-Client
Relationship explores this new model at three levels. First, it develops a
descriptive account of this new understanding of the attorney-client
relationship based on cutting edge practice realities taking place in both the
global legal market and in other competitive markets, including the
automobile industry in Japan, from which Wilkins borrows the term
keiretsu to denote this partnership relationship. Next, the paper lays out a
normative defense of the new model, arguing that it may reintroduce
lawyers as significant strategic advisors for their corporate clients and allow
them the opportunity to act as gatekeepers, promoting and guarding the
public interest as they pursue their clients' private interests. 37 Finally,
Wilkins offers initial thoughts about ethical and regulatory changes
necessary under this new emerging model, simultaneously making
31. Of course, even individual lawyers do not quite fit within the agency model because
rather than act as agents, they tend to exercise authority vis-A-vis their individual clients, but
that is exactly why the Rules of Professional Conduct extend protection to clients and
attempt to keep lawyers at bay.
32. See Wilkins, supra note 27.
33. Id. at 2105.
34. Id. at 2113-14.
35. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucT R. 1.2(b) (2008).
36. Wilkins, supra note 27, at 2070.
37. Id. at 2125-26.
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corporate clients and their lawyers more responsible by making the former
more accountable to their lawyer-partners and making the lawyer-partners
more accountable to third parties and the public. Thus, while the new
partnership model offers large law firms an opportunity to reassert their
strategic importance, reestablish their elite professional standing, and
continue to generate high profits, it also entails new and significant risks of
malpractice and general tort liability and economic instability.
The erosion of the traditional understanding of the attorney-client
relationship, argue Milton C. Regan, Jr., and Palmer T. Heenan, may be just
the tip of the iceberg in terms of the structural changes large law firms
might be forced to contend with. Supply Chains and Porous Boundaries:
The Disaggregation of Legal Services argues that client pressure to become
more productive and cost-effective will force law firms to consider
disaggregating their services and outsourcing some legal work to providers
who can perform it at a lower cost. Applying relevant economic theory and
empirical research, Regan and Heenan suggest that law firms will have to
confront the "make or buy" decision, that is, to decide whether to offer
certain legal services themselves ("make it") or to outsource them to others
("buy it"). 38 Specific decisions will be based on whether the legal services
in question can be decomposed (broken up into discrete units), whether
value can be created for clients (and law firms), and whether the risks
associated with disaggregation and outsourcing, such as maintaining
confidentiality and avoiding conflicts of interest, can be effectively
managed. 39
Law firms are likely to find disaggregating legal services quite
challenging. They will have to become experts in process integration, i.e.,
the ability not only to decompose their products but also to put them back
together efficiently; learn to take advantage of networks outside of the firm,
i.e., outsourcing companies and even law firm alliances; develop effective
methods of knowledge sharing with their network partners subject to the
rules of professional conduct; and become skilled at using and managing
contingent workers, such as contract lawyers and remote attorneys. While
the profitability upside for law firms that master disaggregation is likely to
be high, Regan and Heenan point out that the new landscape of legal
services is at the same time going to be significantly more risky. By
outsourcing, large law firms will lose routine work for which they used to
be able to extract value (by billing clients for the work of junior associates
and paralegals at a premium), and by disaggregating, law firms will face
increased competition from other professional firms who might turn out to
be better at integrating legal services. Moreover, disaggregation will
significantly impact not only large law firms but also the lawyers who work
for them. Regan and Heenan posit that as large law firms begin to employ
more workers outside of the firm, their demand for associates will diminish,
38. Milton C. Regan, Jr. & Palmer T. Heenan, Supply Chains and Porous Boundaries:
The Disaggregation of Legal Services, 78 FoRDHAM L. REv. 2137, 2142-48 (2010).
39. Id. at 2148-59.
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and alternative positions may be created, such as permanent non-partner-
track lawyers.
Another consequence of the Great Recession and its acceleration of
already underway trends leading to increased competitive conditions in the
market for legal services, argues Paul D. Paton, is that the legal profession
is likely to reverse its current stand on multidisciplinary practices (MDP)-
disallowing business structures that entail fee sharing with nonlawyers and
nonlawyer ownership and even control of law firms. In Multidisciplinary
Practice Redux: Globalization, Core Values, and Reviving the MDP
Debate in America, Paton asserts that powerful demand and supply forces
in the global market for legal services-consumer welfare and the economic
interest of the American legal profession competing with overseas law
firms who are able to establish MDP-both lead to the conclusion that "the
question of whether alternative business structures ought to be permitted is
settled and a new reality. Rather, the focus needs to be on when and how
the market should be opened."'40 To that end, Paton offers a critical analysis
of prior MDP debates, which took place in the United States in the 1990s,
in the context of the new economic realities facing the profession in the
aftermath of the economic downturn and reviews developments in
common-law jurisdictions allowing MDP for lessons about how MDP
ought to be engaged and eventually implemented in the United States.
Multidisciplinary Practice Redux: Globalization, Core Values, and
Reviving the MDP Debate in America concludes that the rhetoric of
defending "the 'core values' of the legal profession," often invoked by the
bar as a justification for rejecting MDP,41 served as a proxy for
anticompetitive efforts to limit domestic competition by nonlawyers, 42 a
position the profession can no longer afford to take in an increasingly
global competitive market for legal services. Furthermore, Paton argues,
allowing MDP is not only in the economic self-interest of the bar (and its
clients) but also may be unavoidable: overseas experiences suggest that
refusal to open up the domestic market for legal services to nonlawyers
might cost the legal profession its ability to self-regulate. 43
Read together, the three contributions contained in Part I suggest that in
order to survive, let alone maintain their dominant position atop the legal
profession, large law firms will have to radically change their structure and
organization. Some will have to adopt new models of interaction with
clients, others will rethink their business plans and structure, and yet others
will collaborate with nonlawyers to offer new kinds of services. In the
40. Paul D. Paton, Multidisciplinary Practice Redux: Globalization, Core Values, and
Reviving the MDP Debate in America, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2193, 2196 (2010) (citing
LEGAL SERVS. BD., WIDER ACCESS, BETTER VALUE, STRONG PROTECTION: DISCUSSION
PAPER ON DEVELOPING A REGULATORY REGIME FOR ALTERNATIVE BUSINESS STRUCTURES 4
(2009)).
41. Id. at 2198-99.
42. Id. at 2210.
43. Id. at 2197, 2222.
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process, these firms may end up redefining not only their own practices, but
the meaning and scope of law practice generally.
II. THE CHANGING PROFESSIONAL LANDSCAPE OF LARGE LAW FIRMS
Increasingly competitive practice conditions in the market for corporate
legal services, accentuated by the economic downturn, are transforming not
only the practice realities, the organization, and the structure of large law
firms, but also their professional ideologies. In Glass Ceilings and Dead
Ends: Professional Ideologies, Gender Stereotypes, and the Future of
Women Lawyers at Large Law Firms, I argue that competitive meritocracy,
the prevailing large-firm professional ideology over the last fifty years, is in
decline. 44  Competitive meritocracy is being replaced by a
hypercompetitive ideology that, compared with its predecessor, puts more
emphasis on 24/7 client-centered representation, complete loyalty and
devotion to the firm and its clients, and maximizing profit per partner, and
less emphasis on meritocracy, the exercise of professional judgment, and
cultivation of professional culture and maintaining a sustainable work-life
balance. 45
This transformation is bad news for large law firms because unlike
competitive meritocracy, hypercompetitiveness compromises their claim to
be doing elite work, their ability to recruit and keep elite lawyers, and,
ultimately, the credibility of their claim for elite status. The ideological
shift is particularly devastating for previously excluded minorities at large
law firms seeking equality. Glass Ceilings and Dead Ends studies the
impact of hypercompetitiveness on the career path of women lawyers at
large firms in the context of persisting gender stereotypes and concludes
that the new ideology is likely to magnify the negative consequences of
these stereotypes and further hinder the quest of women lawyers for
equality at large law firms and in the legal profession.
The After the JD (AJD) study is a comprehensive national empirical
study designed to explore the careers of lawyers admitted to the bar in 2000
over the course of their professional lives.46 The first wave of the study
was conducted in 2002-2003 examining early career trajectories, and the
second wave was conducted in 2007-2008 studying lawyers' careers at
seven years in practice. 47 So, You Want To Be a Lawyer? The Quest for
Professional Status in a Changing Legal World reports for the first time
qualitative data from interviews with AID lawyers practicing with large law
44. Eli Wald, Glass Ceilings and Dead Ends: Professional Ideologies, Gender
Stereotypes, and the Future of Women Lawyers at Large Law Firms, 78 FORDHAM L. REv.
2245 (2010).
45. Id.
46. RONIT DINOVITZER ET AL., AM. BAR FOUND. & NALP FOUND. FOR LAW CAREER
RESEARCH & EDUC., AFTER THE JD II: SECOND RESULTS FROM A NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL
CAREERS (2009).
47. Joyce S. Sterling & Nancy Reichman, So, You Want To Be a Lawyer? The Quest for
Professional Status in a Changing Legal World, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 2289,2298-99 (2010).
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firms now almost a full decade into their practice. The paper investigates
the experiences of these lawyers over the first decade of their careers,
paying close attention to their understandings and perceptions of their
professional identities and the impact of the economic downturn on their
career trajectories. In particular, the paper situates its findings in the
context of changes transforming large law firm practices over the last two
decades: the exponential growth of large law firms, increased competition
among law firms and lawyers, a shift from "lockstep" to "eat-what-you-
kill" compensation structures, proliferation and prolonged partnership
tracks, increased billable hour requirements, and a shift of power from large
law firms to their clients.48 Indeed, many of the contributions to this
Symposium explore consequences of these ongoing changes to large law
firm practice realities.
Joyce S. Sterling and Nancy Reichman report these changes, which are
accentuated by massive layoffs and delayed promotions in the wake of the
economic downturn. For those lawyers of the class of 2000 who are caught
in a holding pattern, demoted, laid off, or have fled the large firm,
becoming a partner is elusive and the quest for professional status is
difficult. Amidst these changes, these lawyers seek to define themselves
professionally. While some law graduates joined large law firms without
much thought of professional identity, 49 others joined seeking training
(human capital), connections (social capital), and professional prestige and
standing.50  As large law firms struggle to deliver these professional
dividends in an increasingly competitive business environment while
continuing to demand grueling hours, some of their young lawyers opt out
in search of professional identity and purpose.
III. THE EVOLVING INSTITUTIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE FOR ETHICAL DECISION MAKING AT LARGE LAW FIRMS
Risk management practices and mechanisms are spreading among large
law firms, and, in the aftermath of the economic downturn, the trend may
gather additional steam because as large law firms struggle to cut costs and
minimize their exposure to liabilities, the language and culture of risk
management and avoidance seem like an obvious step in the right direction.
In The Risk of Risk Management, Stephan Landsman cautions about the
danger in making strategic organizational decisions in times of great
economic instability and uncertainty: while, on the one hand, risk
management policies might enhance thoughtful ethical deliberation within
large law firms, they might, on the other hand, compromise it. Increased
large law firm reliance on risk management procedures before their
relationship with ethical compliance and lawyer integrity is further
delineated might, ironically, turn out to be a risky move. Exploring the
48. Id. at 2293-96.
49. Id. at 2302.
50. Id. at 2302-09.
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implications of the rise of legal risk management by viewing it through the
lens of risk management's impact on the practice of medicine, Landsman
advises that lawyers ought to embrace risk management slowly and
cautiously. Insights from the medical context suggest that because risk
management inherently attempts to protect the law firm from its clients, it
drives a wedge into the attorney-client relationship, in particular, fostering a
"wall of silence" environment between attorney and client inconsistent with
the full and frank communications that are essential for an effective
attorney-client relationship. Moreover, as they grow in scope and
importance, risk management processes might overshadow or even crowd
out sound ethical decision making by individual lawyers representing
clients. Next, risk management might inhibit innovation, creative
lawyering, and new styles of law firm management and organization, which
other authors in this Symposium have argued will be crucial for large law
firm survival. 51
Based on the medical industry's experience with risk management,
Landsman offers several cautionary notes, as law firms proceed with the
implementation of risk prevention and management procedures. First, as
risk management becomes institutionalized, risk managers are hired, and
loss prevention departments become commonplace, 52 law firms ought to be
mindful of the tension between their overall client-centered orientation and
the firm-based perspective of the risk management unit. Second, such
intrafirm tension, even power struggles, might shift firms' focus and
allegiance from clients to itself. Finally, to the extent that error reduction
comes through the improvement of systems rather than the chastisement of
individuals, risk management's emphasis on individuals might not be
ultimately conducive toward the goal of better service of clients.
In Listening to Cassandra: The Difficulty of Recognizing Risks and
Taking Action, Carol A. Needham studies the reasons for the collapse of the
residential mortgage credit market, which led to the freezing of other credit
markets and eventually to the economic downturn of 2008-2009. Needham
argues that deregulation allowed the creation of high-risk lending entities
and that the Federal Reserve, responsible for supervising these new entities,
refused to exercise its supervisory powers notwithstanding increased risk
taking and numerous warning signs throughout the 1990s and in the years
leading to the economic meltdown. This regulatory failure to identify the
growing risks and to respond to them in time, claims Needham, was the
result of ineffective and mistaken leadership in top positions, "groupthink"
mentality at the Federal Reserve, dismissal of dissent by "naysayers," and
cognitive failures. 53 The psychological factors and institutional reasons that
led to the Federal Reserve's failure to recognize the growing risk in the
51. Stephan Landsman, The Risk of Risk Management, 78 FORDUAM L. REv. 2315
(2010).
52. This is akin, perhaps, to the professionalization and institutionalization of pro bono
and the creation of pro bono counsel. See Cummings & Rhode, supra note 8.
53. Needham, supra note 27.
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residential mortgage credit market and to take appropriate timely action
illustrate how reasonable and ethical decision making, by nonlawyers,
lawyers, and organizations alike, may be frustrated by the powerful
interplay of ineffective and rigid organizational infrastructure and dominant
entity culture.
Moreover, Listening to Cassandra raises important questions about the
roles (and lack thereof) of private and public lawyers in financial markets,
regulatory design, and regulatory oversight and sets the stage for assessing
the role of the legal profession in dealing with the aftermath of the
economic downturn. The economic downturn of 2008-2009 might in this
sense illustrate the concern that the problem with attorneys in recent
scandals is not so much that they were at the scene of the crime and looked
the other way, but rather that they were absent from the scene of the crime
and could not have played a role in preventing it.54
IV. LARGE LAW FIRMS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: PROVISION OF PRO
BONO SERVICES BY LARGE LAW FIRMS
In Managing Pro Bono: Doing Well by Doing Good, Scott Cummings
and Deborah Rhode explore the increased institutionalization and
professionalization of pro bono programs at large law firms. Their
empirical study examines the reasons for and consequences of the changing
institutional status of pro bono done by large firms and details the various
programs, designs, and institutional infrastructures by which large law firms
implement their commitment to pro bono, such as the expanding role of pro
bono counsel. The paper situates these developments within the general
trend of professionalizing pro bono outside of large firms, contributes to the
quantitative understanding of pro bono work done by these for-profit
entities, and argues that the current focus on quantity (driven by rankings)
and training (driven by the large law firms' professional development
needs) may have eclipsed the public function of lawyers' public service.55
Cummings and Rhode argue that the professionalization of pro bono
programs is, and is going to be in the future, an important factor in
promoting public service in good times and protecting it in bad times. They
make their case by examining the effects of the increased
professionalization on the provision of pro bono during the recent economic
downturn, explaining both its short-term consequences 56 and long-term
implications. 57 Moreover, and perhaps most provocatively, Managing Pro
Bono asserts that the increased institutionalization and professionalization
54. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 231 (2006); see also ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER (1993)
(arguing that increased competition and specialization have limited the ability of attorneys to
exercise "practical wisdom" and act as "Lawyer-statesmen" on behalf of their clients and the
public interest); Wilkins, supra note 27, at 2125.
55. Cummings & Rhode, supra note 8, at 2394-408, 2430-34.
56. Id. at 2409-13.
57. Id. at2413-19.
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of pro bono in large law firms may transform the meaning of pro bono
generally and redirect its purposes. The growing assimilation of pro bono
to large firms blurs the line between paid and nonpaid work and collapses
the traditional distinction between private interests and the public good.58
Indeed, the paper embodies the new and complex practice realities it
identifies: it is a study of pro bono, the public interest, and the public
sphere while at the same time an examination of the large law firm, the so-
called bastion of paid work, the pursuit of private interests, and the locus of
increased commercialization and profit maximization.
In a reply titled The Paradoxes of Pro Bono, Richard Abel acknowledges
the important role large law firms' pro bono has played in realizing the
promise of equal justice under the law, especially given the limited funding
available to the traditional providers of pro bono services, while vividly
pointing out the oddity in "having privileged lawyers-who earn huge
incomes by acting for large corporations and wealthy individuals-
constitute a major source of legal representation for the poor and
subordinated" 59  The odd marriage between pro bono and large firms
necessitates further inquiry, and Abel joins the call by Cummings and
Rhode for additional research on the impact and consequences of large law
firms' provision of pro bono services.
Abel's reply highlights certain aspects of large law firms' pro bono as
worthy of attention. First, pro bono practices at large firms are heavily
influenced by rankings, awards, and a prestige hierarchy, which in turn
impacts, and arguably distorts, the selection of cases handled and allocation
of resources. Second, pro bono services are a function, and often a by-
product, of the firm's economics. What partners support as pro bono, why
they do so, and what associates they assign to such projects are questions
that get decided based on perceptions of paying clients' responses and
associates' training needs as much as they do by the merits of the pro bono
cases. Third, the pro bono services provided by large firms reflect an
individualistic approach in the selection of cases (based on the subjective
preferences of individual pro bono counsel, partners, and associates), the
selection of recipients (mostly individual matters to avoid conflicts with
paying clients), and in the identity of and work product of the lawyers who
provide them (primarily individual associates practically working alone).
The economic downturn demonstrates some of these oddities and
highlights the need for further research. Abel points out, for example, that
in an attempt to save costs, large law firms paid law graduates to work in
public interest for a year on a reduced first-year-associate salary. These
newly minted graduates, still earning more than more experienced career
lawyers at public interest entities, left at the end of the year to double their
salaries, likely leaving behind the career public interest attorneys somewhat
disgruntled. Moreover, at the same time that they possibly destabilized the
58. Id. at 2364-65, 2426.
59. Richard Abel, The Paradoxes of Pro Bono, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 2443, 2443 (2010).
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pro bono entities, large firms have become increasingly reluctant to commit
significant resources to large in-house pro bono projects, further
compromising the pro bono agenda. Large law firms are likely to persist as
major pro bono actors, but their growing presence in the public interest
sphere creates paradoxes in need of attention.
